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This paper examines the impact of messaging and technical standards on 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten tekniset ja viestistandardit vaikuttavat 
arvopapereiden selvityspalveluita tuottavan sektorin kilpailullisuuteen. Standar-
dien markkinoille pääsyn esteisiin liittyviä sekä niiden arvopapereiden käsittelyä 
yksinkertaistavien ja yhdenmukaistavien menettelyiden käyttöönottoa kannustavia 
vaikutuksia havainnollistetaan kahden käyttäjien vaihtokustannusten merkitystä 
korostavan yksinkertaisen mallin avulla. Analyysin politiikkajohtopäätöksissä vii-
tataan mahdollisuuteen, että eurooppalaisten viranomaisten on päätöksillään pako-
tettava palveluiden tuottajat omaksumaan yhteinen arvopapereiden selvitys-
standardi. 
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This paper discusses the role of standard setting as it aﬀects competition
in securities settlement, paying particular attention to the implications for
the development of pan-European and global arrangements for securities
settlement. Standard setting for messages and ‘interoperability’ of securities
settlement systems has become a central practitioner issue in the past few
years. This has happened for two main reasons. The ﬁrst is the widespread
desire in the industry for greater automation of post-trade processing,
achieving as great a degree of ‘straight through processing’ or STP as possible.
This goal has been promoted in particular by a recent report of the Group
of Thirty on global securities processing (G30, 2003). The second reason
is the eﬀorts to remove or reduce the various barriers to a single European
market in post-trade securities clearing and settlement, identiﬁed by the ﬁrst
report of the Giovannini group (Giovannini, 2002). The second Giovannini
report proposed a series of actions to address these barriers (Giovannini
Group, 2003). This report gave SWIFT, together with the practitioner
network SMPG (Securities Market Practice Group) supported by SWIFT,
the role of facilitating an industry wide project for harmonising messaging
and inter-operability standards for securities settlement across Europe, thus
addressing the ﬁrst of the ﬁfteen Giovannini barriers to pan-European
securities clearing and settlement.
The main point developed in this paper is that standard setting in securities
settlement is not just important to lowering processing costs and improving
cross-border inter-operability, it is also a central determinant of competition
in associated services such as securities custody and the management of
securities transactions. The harmonisation of securities settlement standards
being achieved both in Europe and globally is welcome. But both customers
(investors in securities) and regulators need to pay attention to how these
standards evolve. It should not be assumed that producers will always fully
support and implement changes in standards even when these reduce customer
processing costs and promote eﬃcient cross-border transaction management.
One reason for resistance to change is that simpliﬁed open standards can be
expected to lead to increased competition and hence lower proﬁts in securities
transaction services. This argument, while it has been previously made with
reference to the process of standard setting in other industries (see Section
3) does not seem to have been previously articulated in relation to securities
settlement.
The argument of this paper is also relevant to other account based
ownership networks such as systems of payments or foreign exchange
transactions.1 In these networks standards determine the ability of diﬀerent
parties (owners, providers of ownership accounts, providers of transaction
services) to eﬀect changes in ownership and provide transaction services such as
the monitoring of accounts and provision of credit facilities. Standard setting
is not just about supporting inter-operability (‘straight through processing’)
1Milne (2005) provides a more detailed discussion of ownership networks and their role
in both payments and securities settlement.
7but also about facilitating competition and innovation in such transaction
management services.
The modelling of this paper, analysing securities settlement as an ownership
network, complements recent work on payments and securities settlement,
d r a w i n go nt h el i t e r a t u r eo n‘ t w o - s i d e dp l a t f o r m s ’( f o ra ni n t r o d u c t i o nt o
this literature see Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2004; Armstrong, 2004, and
several other recent papers, including Chakravorti and Roson, 2004, who
apply the analysis of the two-sided platform to the case of payment cards.)
Payment cards are one of several examples of two sided platforms. Others
include securities markets, derivative markets, gaming devices and disc players,
hardware or operating systems and software, dating systems such as dating
agencies or even night clubs, real estate agents (bringing together buyers
and sellers), and shopping malls (ditto). This recent literature on two-sided
platform literature has focussed (mostly) on the pricing of the two sides of
these platform market (where buyers and sellers pay diﬀerent participation
and transaction fees) and the determination of any internal payment between
providers, such as the interchange fee paid by merchant acquirers to credit-card
issuers.
Membership and per-transaction charges are a critical aspect of two-sided
platforms. In two-sided platforms charges are the principal determinants of
the number of participants on each side of the market and volume of usage,
with participation especially sensitive to charging when there is competition
between platforms. Appropriate pricing may overcome problems of low usage
volumes and lack of participation that might undermine the viability of the
platform (as noted below in the concluding Section 5 there can still be a
problem of critical mass in the adoption of open messaging standards, but
since standards are not charged this problem cannot be overcome through
pricing mechanisms as is possible in two-sided platforms).
In any case in ownership networks, such as securities and bank accounts,
transaction volumes are relatively unaﬀected by pricing and, moreover, there
is often no clear distinction between the two sides of the network (eg active
securities traders act equally as both buyers and sellers). It is then reasonable
to assume (as in Milne, 2005a, and in Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran, 2002)
that the volume of activity on the network is unaﬀected by relative pricing of
the two sides of the platform. The analysis provided in this paper therefore
ignores two-sided platform aspects of securities settlement. The network eﬀects
modelled here arise because of switching costs, not as a result of installed base
externalities associated with the number of other users of the platform.2
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides a brief summary
of the role of messaging and other standards in securities processing, noting
some of the diﬃculties facing the adoption of open XML-based data standards.
Section 3 then discusses some literature on the economics of standard setting,
assessing how far this literature are relevant to securities processing. This
literature oﬀers diﬀerent viewpoints on the relationship between standards
and competition. While standardisation can reduce barriers to entry and
2This is an anlytical simpliﬁcation, neglecting both the liquidity externalities in securities
settlement (Holthausen and Tapking, 2003) and the two-sided platform incentives for issuers
and investors to participate in the securities market (Rochet, 2005).
8increase competition it is also possible (in the presence of network eﬀects) for
standardisation to reduce price competition and lead to higher proﬁts. The
literature also discusses the responsibility for setting of standards, whether this
should be undertaken by individual ﬁrms, by consortia of ﬁrms, by industry
bodies, or by public authorities.
Section 4 presents two simple models of securities securities transaction
services, based on the assumption that competition in securities transaction
services is limited by the costs of switching from one supplier to another. The
ﬁrst, basic, model considers competition within a domestic market between
an incumbent and a domestic competitor. The proﬁts of the incumbent are
determined by the switching costs, the number of customers, and any cost
advantage enjoyed by the incumbent.
This model is then extended to the situation of international competition,
where the possibility of capture by a competitor that already has covered
the ﬁxed costs of providing securities transaction services further reduces
incumbent proﬁtability. In these models proﬁt-maximising producers of
securities transaction services are likely to resist standardisation of transaction
processing, because such changes are both costly and reduce switching costs
and entry barriers, hence lowering proﬁtability.
Section 5 concludes by considering how eﬃcient standard setting can
be promoted, especially in the context of current policy debates about
pan-European securities settlement. If the private business incentives for
h a r m o n i s i n gs t a n d a r d sa r ei n d e e da sw e a ka ss u g g e s t e db yt h em o d e l so f
this paper, then the ownership, objectives, and governance of post-trade
institutions will be crucial to the eﬀective adoption of harmonised standards.
An Appendix provides model solutions.
2 Standard setting in securities processing
This section provides a brief introduction to the variety of messaging and other
standards used in the processing of securities trades, and current progress
towards the creation of open, simpliﬁed, standards. Historically securities
messaging and processing arrangements have developed in an unco-ordinated
fashion, sponsored by particular trading platforms and national arrangements
for post-trade processing. Non-electronic (telephone and open-outcry) trading
has been converted into ﬁrm-speciﬁc order and trading formats for electronic
procesing. There has been diversity between diﬀerent electronic platforms,
thus equity trades in say Paris have been recorded using diﬀerent conventions
than equity trades in other centres; and within ﬁnancial centres there have been
diﬀerent conventions for diﬀerent markets (equities versus ﬁxed income versus
the diﬀerent OTC derivatives and derivative exchanges). Diﬀerent providers
of security processing services have also developed there own procedures.
This variety has led to the promotion by regulators of minimum standards
for the safe and secure operation of securities settlement, including the
minimum recommendations of the CPSS-IOSCO (CPSS-IOSCO, 2003) and
their extension in the European context (ECB 2005). These standards, while
9of great practical importance, are not central to the argument developed in
this paper and so are not considered further.
What is central are the standards and procedures used for communicating
and processing messages in securities trading and processing. Over recent
years the industry has been developing generic procedures that can be used
across a range of trading and post-trade communications, notably the ‘FIX
protocol’ for real-time, electronic communication between traders in securities
markets (a collaborative eﬀort between the worlds major investment banks
and asset managers, see www.ﬁxprotocol.org ) and the post-trade MT message
formats promoted by SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication, a user co-operative of which most of the worlds large
and medium sized ﬁnancial institutions are members, see www.swift.com).
These are both widely used and the development of industry software has
become orientated around these two procedures, improving the automation of
processing.
Nonetheless, these formats are not fully standardised, with considerable
local variations in the way they are applied across systems and between ﬁrms.
They are moreoever diﬃcult to update. Changes in these standards can
require wide-ranging adjustments to computer systems and business processes
by ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Because implementation varies widely, any change in
business relationship, eg obtaining transaction management services from a
new supplier, involves very substantial IT system costs. The adoption of more
fully harmonised and simpliﬁed standards will reduce these switching costs, a
point that underlies the analysis developed in Section 4 below.
FIX and MT are ‘tag-value’ based (organised as a sequence of ﬁelds,
each introduced and ended by pre-deﬁned tags, and obeying a fairly closely
deﬁned structure within each ﬁeld). Future development of straight through
processing will be facilitated by the use of extensible mark up (XML) data
formats, developed for the sharing of data across the world wide web.3 XML
allows much richer message content, supports browser based interaction and
communication and are hence are fully software and hardware independent.
XML documents can also be somewhat more transparent and human readable.
Moreover (because the markup tags are deﬁned by the user rather than
embodied in the standard) XML is well suited to incorporating future changes
in technology and processing arrangements.
Perhaps most important of all, XML standards are especially well suited
to supporting distributed rather than centralised processing (see Milne (2005)
for further discussion of this point). With XML standards and distributed
processing it is no longer, for example, necessary to create centralised
processing hubs in order to facilitate European wide securities processing
(neither ‘hub and spoke’ nor ‘spaghetti’ models of post-trade securities
processing are required); instead almost aspects of securities processing can be
handled through a decentralised computing network, with processing of trades
handled by individual buyers and sellers, and communications with centralised
institutions (settlement banks and securities depositories) only necessary to
3A tutorial introduction to XML, explaining how it diﬀers from HTML, is provided on
the website www.w3schools.com/xml/default.asp .
10conﬁrm transfer of securities and or money in ﬁnal settlement. For more
details on how such a distributed processing of securities trades can work see
Leinonen (2003).
XML versions of FIX and the MT message formats are now being developed
(currently there is pre-trade, FIXML, and SWIFT is working on post-trade
XML formats). However the approach taken has been one of XML-conversion,
little more than the addition of additional ‘mark up’ to existing formats so
they are are consistent with XML. This approach fails to take advantage of the
most important potential eﬃciency gains oﬀered by XML language. Promotion
of straight through processing will be much better supported by introducing
entirely new protocols and message standards that take full advantage of the
possibilities of XML, but to date there appears to be little appetite in the
industry for this kind of radical cost-saving development. The analysis of the
present paper provides one explanation of why securities service providers are
reluctant to embrace new processing methods.
The ‘Tower report’ (SWIFT, 2005) commissioned by SWIFT conﬁrms that
adoption of open standards-based technologies is at best a slow evolution. This
survey based report found that client demand is the critical business driver,
with most ﬁnancial services ﬁrms anticipating — for the foreseeable future —
coexistence of proprietary and open (especially XML-based) standards. XML
and other open standards are not without their challenges, including that
of achieving critical mass, and so may never be widely adopted. Survey
participants supported SWIFT’s cautious approach to standards, encouraging
a common standardisation methodology and process and a common repository
for ﬁnancial message standards (see www.swift.com), but agreeing that
the range of standards initiatives is simply too great to achieve complete
uniformity.
Both FIX and MT standards have been developed in connection with
the ISO15022 standards for ﬁnancial market messaging. As described on
the ISO15022 webpages (www.iso15022.org) ‘ISO 15022 sets the principles
necessary to provide the diﬀerent communities of users with the tools to design
message types to support their speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o nﬂows. These tools consist
of a set of syntax and message design rules, a dictionary of data ﬁelds and a
catalogue for present and future messages built by the industry with the above
mentioned ﬁelds and rules. To address the evolving needs of the industry
as they arise, the Data Field Dictionary and Catalogue of Messages have
been kept outside the standard. They are made available by the Registration
Authority which maintains them as necessary upon the request of industry
participants.’ The Registration Authority function for ISO15022 is provided
by SWIFT. Parallel XML standards for ﬁnancial market messaging fall under
ISO20022 (www.iso20022.org).
Further evidence of the challenges to harmonisation of standards in
securities processing can be found from the website of the securities market
practice group (www.smpg.info). This documents the monthly meetings
of the various national market practice groups, and the two meetings per
year of the SMPG. In the recent past these meetings have covered a great
number of issues ranging from the speciﬁc such as ‘standardised methods of
informing custodians to transfer securities’ and ‘resolution of cross-matching at
11central securities depositories’, to the strategic such as creation of NMPGs in
non-participating countries and the development of multi-year project plans.
All this makes clear that establishing global or even European standardisation
of securities processing is a substantial and detailed task.
To summarise, while there has been progress on developing open ﬁnancial
messaging formats and standards, the use of these formats continues to diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from one trading context to another and from one ﬁrm to another.
This creates substantial switching costs, for any ﬁrm that moves securities
processsing business from one supplier to another. There are moreover a
number of other continuing diﬀerences in market practice and conventions,
such as those identiﬁed by the Giovannini (2001) report. Thus, despite the
increasing adoption of FIX-protocols and use of SWIFT message formats,
harmonisation of securities messaging and other processing standards remains
far from complete. The shift to XML formats, while oﬀering great potential
for improved automation, still has a long way to go.
Why has adoption of new standards been so slow? Convergence on
standards on is ultimately a business decision for individual ﬁnancial market
participants. Changes can be costly, because legacy computer systems then
have to be re-engineered or replaced. Furthermore, as argued formally in
Section 4 below, providers of securities transactions services can also lose
competitive advantage from the shift to shared and simpliﬁed standards. Full
harmonisation of securities processing standards is likely to require sustained
pressure from ﬁnal customers, especially institutional investors and trading
institutions, and also from public authorities.
3 The economics of standard setting
This section brieﬂy reviews some of existing literature on the economics
of standard setting and its relevance to securities processing standards.4
Individual ﬁrms,industry bodies, and government are all concerned with
various aspects of standards. These standards include rules on health and
safety, on minimum product quality, restrictions on product design to ensure
compatibility of complementary products (eg electrical or plumbing standards
that ensure not just safety but also that a range of diﬀerent components work
together) as well as compatibility standards for speciﬁc products.
A major question addresed in the literature is who should take
responsibility for setting standards? Health and safety standards are usually
the responsibility of government or regulators (thus ﬁnancial regulators,
through CPSS/IOSCO, have taken the lead in setting standards for safety
in payment and settlement systems). Public sector bodies, such as
telecommunications regulators, may also play a co-ordinating role in standard
setting. At the opposite extreme from these standards set by public bodies
are those set by a coalition of voluntary participants, most notably the
4Blind (2004) provides detailed review of the economics of standards. See also discussions
of standard setting in surveys of the economics of networks such as Shy (2001), Farrell and
Klemperer (2001), and Scotchmer (2004) chapter 10.
12open-standards supporting the internet (TCP/IP data transfer protocols,
HTML display, XML data storage standard), such standards are the outcome
of innovation and co-operation between various users, many in public sector
defense and research institutions. The ‘open-source’ software movement
reﬂects a continued commitment to this mechanism of creating and developing
standards.
Finally standards may be set by industry participants, either by individual
ﬁrms, by consortia of ﬁrms, or by industry established standard setting
organisations (or SSOs). This is the usual practice for many engineering,
product compatibility and communication standards. The FIX consortium and
SWIFT are examples of such industry based standard setting organisations in
securities trading and settlement. The standard setting process is likely to
favour such industry based mechanism, in cases where public sector bodies
lack the necessary technical knowledge and where existing incumbents in the
industry have a strong interest in inﬂuencing the development of standards.
The academic literature has paid particular attention to cases of ‘de facto’
standards for complementary products with ‘adoption’ or ‘installed base’
externalities (also often referred to as ‘network externalities’ although this term
is used in other senses as well). Such standards can usually be described as ‘de
facto’ because they are established through competition in the market place,
after being introduced by a single producer or group of producers. There are
many well known examples where such de facto standards are of importance,
including computer operating systems and software; games consoles and games;
and other entertainment platforms such as VHS, DVD, CD, and the disks or
cassettes they play. Standards are essential because the two products will not
work together without them. In these cases there is then an ‘installed base’
externality associated with the number of consumers using the product — for
example the greater the market share of a particular console, then the more
games that can be viably marketed with that console format and the more
attractive is this console to the consumer.
Where there are network externalities of this kind then individual producers
may gain substantially if they establish their own proprietary standards as
the dominant standard (leading to the phenomena of ‘standard races’ where
competing ﬁrms seek to establish their own patented standard). Producers
of complementary products (eg game designers) may then pay substantially
to make use of the standard. The literature examines many particular
examples of competing standards including 52K modems, betamax versus VHS
videocassettes, and others. Because of the possibility of losing a standard
race, providers may seek from the outset to establish the acceptance of a
standard amongst a consortium of producers. Strategic aspects have also been
explored, including the choices of open licensing (VHS succeeded in capturing
the videocassette market by making its standard freely available) or second
sourcing (eg free distribution of Adobe Reader), commitment and reputation
for commitment (eg Sony maintaining commitment to losing brand Betamax
may have been rational), pre-announcement (including the phenomena of
‘vapourware’ announced products that never appear). There are more than 50
academic articles around these issues.
13Where there are switching or co-ordination costs then several contributions
to the literature suggests that there can be ‘lock in’ to inferior standards,
because the installed based cannot be easily replaced by the newer superior
standards (Katz and Shapiro, 1994), although this has been contested eg by
Liebovitz and Margolis (1999), while Farrell and Saloner (1985) have argued
changes in standards can be ineﬃciently costly (so called ‘excess inertia’).
Another issue is whether the introduction of ‘convertors’ between standards
can overcome ineﬃciencies (Choi, 1996), although David and Steinmuller
(1990) have argued that this can frustrate the development of more eﬃcient
overarching standards.
The literature on the economics of standards has paid relatively less
attention to the alternative to ‘de facto’ standard setting, where standards
are instead agreed amongst industry participants through so called standard
setting organisations (or SSOs). Standards set by SSOs are open, not closed,
so they do not provide any participants with the competitive advantage of an
installed base locked into a dominant proprietary standard. They do however
help overcome the potential co-ordination costs of moving to a new industry
standard.
There are a number of case studies of SSOs (eg Sirbu and Zwimpfer (1985),
an examination of the X25 packet switching standard, the Besen and Johnson
(1986) analysis of broadcast standards, and the wider-ranging comparisons
found in Wiess and Sirbu (1990)). Chiao et al (2005) provide an empirical
analysis of standard setting using data on some sixty SSOs in the engineering
industries. They ﬁnd broad support for the predictions of the theoretical model
of Lerner and Tirole (2004), which suggests that the degree of concessions to
users (eg access to royalty free licensing) is positively correlated with the degree
of user-orientation of the SSOs (speciﬁcally their results are based on a set of
measures of the extent to which the SSO is run by standard providers rather
than users). Chiao et al (2005) also ﬁnd that willingness to disclose technical
details (such as underlying patents) is also positively related to the degree of
user-orientation.
A case more closely related to that of complementary products with
installed based externalites, but with some additional speciﬁc features, is
that of communication networks. Examples include telecommunications,
email, internet. Communication networks are also characterised by ‘adoption
externalities’, the utility from owning the product or joining the network
is directly increasing in the number of other customers (this is thus
slightly diﬀerent from the indirect externality associated with installed base
and the variety of complimentary products). Standards are essential for
communication to be possible (a rather hackneyed example is that a fax
machine must obey the same standards as other fax machines, or provide
a translation between standards, in order to send/recieve faxes to/from other
fax machines.)
Standards for communication networks are usually established by a
consortia of companies or by a standard setting organisation, not by a single
company. But there are exceptions eg computer ﬁles. Other aspects of
standards are speciﬁc to communication networks eg the necessity of agreed
routing standards (such as international phone preﬁxes) where a central
14authority may be needed to maintain such arrangements. There are also strong
incentives, at least at regional level, to harmonise communication standards
across an industry. Thus within Europe for example, or North America, public
sector authorities play an important role in co-ordinating standard setting eg
for mobile telephony.
One further conclusion from the study of communication networks, is that
imposing standards to ensure that diﬀerent systems can communicate with
each other (interconnection or interoperability) does not ensure that such
interconnection is eﬃciently priced. An example is the termination of mobile
telephone calls. This is an access monopoly, only the subscribers host network
can successfully locate the subscriber and ensure that they receive a call
intended for them. They may charge callers a large fee, in order to exploit
the lack of competition in call termination. At domestic level access-pricing
regulations generally limit the ability of host networks to exploit this access
monopoly. But there is no such access-pricing regulation for calls that are
terminated for roaming mobile telephones, temporarily hosted by networks in
other countries. The termination of calls to roaming mobile telephones thus
typically leads to ineﬃciently high levels of charges to both the owner of the
phone and to the incoming caller.5
It is sometimes argued that ‘open standards’ are better for competitive
eﬃciency than closed proprietary standards. But this is not always true.
Incentives for innovation must also be taken into account. Furthermore
a proprietary standard, which can be exploited for proﬁt, may be more
aggressively promoted and therefore stand a greater chance of being accepted
than an open standard (Katz and Shapiro, 1994).
Also, where there are network externalities associated with the size of
installed base, ﬁrms competing under incompatible standards may compete
more aggressively to raise market share and hence exploit these externalities.
This can lead to greater price competition with incompatible standards, than
when standards are open (see Shy, 2001, chapter 3 for application of this
argument to the case of competition between software).
For standards agreed at pan-industrial level, including communication
standards such as those of FIX or SWIFT in securities trading and settlement,
the issue of open versus closed is not central. In these cases patents are
not used to limit access, rather these standards are designed to be open to
all participants. Nonetheless the issue still arises as to whether consumer
interests are adequately reﬂected in the process of setting such standards; or
whether these favour existing industry incumbents at the expense of smaller
ﬁrms or new entrants and hence at the cost of higher customer prices or
reduced incentives for innovation.6 The argument of the present paper,
that communication standards play a key role in determining the level of
competition in securities transaction services, implies that regulators and
5There is an apparent parallel with the argument for access regulation in network utilities
such as gas, electricity. Milne (2006b) argues that such access regulation can be appropriate
for securities settlement.
6An example of the strategy of raising rival’s costs, identiﬁed by Salop and Scheﬀman
(1983).
15consumers (in particular institutional investors) should be concerned with the
outcome of standard setting in securities settlement.
4 Models of standard setting in an securities
ownership network
This section presents two simple formal models, with the goal of clarifying
the role of standard setting in determining competition in securities securities
transaction services. These securities securities transaction services include
monitoring and predicting the balances in accounts, summarising this
information for clients, preparing for transfers of ownership by ensuring
that both securities and cash are ‘positioned’ (ie ready for ﬁnal delivery
versus payment), dealing with any processing exceptions, and where necessary
providing loan facilities (securities or cash lending) in order to fulﬁll transaction
obligations. These ‘value added’ services are major sources of revenue for
custodians and CSDs.
The set ups explored here do not distinguish custodian services (managing
security income, taxation, or dealing with corporate actions such as voting
in annual shareholder meetings, rights issues, or proposed mergers and
acquisitions) from transaction management. Also as already discussed they
also ignore pricing issues of the kind explored in the literature on two-sided
platforms, assuming that demand for the number transactions is ﬁxed,
customers engaging in a given number of security transactions in each period.
In practice ﬁrms typically obtain securities transaction services from a
principal supplier (a major bank or a securities depository) for each national
market. They do not ‘shop’ around, switching from one supplier to another or
obtaining these services from a large number of competitors. These features
suggest that the relationship with the supplier is important and that there are
signiﬁcant costs to ending this relationship and turning to a new alternative
supplier. However the adoption of open and more ﬂexible standards is likely
to make such a switch less costly.
The provision of both underlying security accounts and of bank accounts
for the settlement of securities trades are exogenous to these models. Thus
these models are not appropriate for examining the competitive impact of
settlement in central bank money versus settlement in private commercial bank
money. Nor do they allow for the liquidity externalities that play a key role
in determining the supply securities accounts (such as appear in Holthausen
and Tapking, 2003). Trading activity in securities and derivatives tends to
migrate towards a single market platform, because increasing liquidity reduces
bid-ask spreads and hence achieves lower trading cost, so attracts more trading
and further reduces liquidity. There is a similar ‘virtuous circle’ of liquidity
that attracts securities transactions to dominant CSDs or ICSDs. For this
reason most settlement volumes for securities, even international securities, is
attracted to a single dominant location. The models presented here simply
assume that accounts for any given security are initially provided by a single
encumbent provider (though such liquidity eﬀects and the resulting need
16to co-ordinate a shift to an alternative supplier could be considered as one
component of the switching cost C).
These models make further simplifying assumptions. All producers are
assumed to be proﬁt maximisers (in practice many suppliers of securities
transaction services eg Euroclear or DTCC are owned by customers and trading
platforms and so are clearly not proﬁt maximisers). All customers are assumed
to be the same size, and the only variability in their demand for transactions
is that foreign investors may have a lower level of transactions demand in
domestic securities than domestic investors. It is assumed that switching costs
C are the same for all customers, so the incumbent or competitor capture
either none or all of the market. Finally all providers of securities transactions
services have access to the same basic technology, implying common variable
costs of provision. This might seem inconsistent with the presence of signiﬁcant
switching costs. But if diﬀerent providers use the same technology operated
under their own proprietary standards, or even with relatively small diﬀerences
in the implementation of common standards, a switch in supplier can still be
a costly exercise.
4.1 Model 1: competition between domestic CSD and
custodian
This ﬁrst model explores how the proﬁtability of securities transaction services
depends upon the ﬁxed costs C to customers of switching from one domestic
service provider to another. Messaging and communication standards can alter
these switching costs as well as the costs of providing these services.
4.1.1 Switching costs and CSD pricing and proﬁts
There is a single security, for which the security accounts are provided by
an incumbent CSD. These N account holders obtain securities transaction
services, either from the CSD or from a competing custodian bank. The CSD
operates with a ﬁxed cost of X0. The competing custodian bank operates
its own security account with the CSD and also uses this account to provide
security loans to account holders, but to do this must pay additional ﬁxed
linkage costs of X1 and so has a total ﬁxed cost of X1 + X0.7
Initially the CSD provides securities transaction services to all N
transactors in the security. There are variable per customer costs of X2 and
per transaction costs of X3. These are assumed to be the same for both the
CSD and the custodian.
7There are two elements to X1, the linkage charge by the CSD and the technical costs of
establishing and maintaining the link. It will turn out that incumbent proﬁts are increasing
in X1, creating an incentive to increase the linkage charge element of X1 as much as
possible; however this is a very visible contribution to post-trade processing costs, so it
seems appropriate to assume that the charged element of X1 is set on a cost plus basis, ie
it is limited by regulation or customer ownership.
17Normalising the average level of transactions to unity, the total costs
of providing N customers with securities transaction services are X0 +
N (X2 + X3) for the incumbent CSD and X0 + X1 + N (X2 + X3) for the
competitor custodian.
Price announcements are staggered. The incumbent CSD ﬁrst chooses a
ﬁxed price per customer for securities transaction services of Λ.T h ec o m p e t i n g
custodian then either chooses not to enter the market or chooses to enter the
market charging a ﬁxed price of Λ0 per customer. The volume of customers
choosing the incumbent CSD is then given by
½
N Λ ≤ Λ0 + C
0 Λ > Λ0 + C
Because the switching cost is the same for all customers, the incumbent either
captures the entire market for transaction management (n = N), with no
entry, or cedes the entire market for transaction management to the competitor
(n =0 ).
In this case potential competition from the competing custodian restrains
the ﬁxed price Λ set by the CSD for providing securities transaction services.
If it chooses Λ > X1
N + X2 + C then the competing custodian bank is able
to choose Λ0 = Λ − C +   = X1
N + X2 +   for some  >0,c a p t u r i n ga l lt h e
customers (n =0 ), and making a positive proﬁt Π0 = N × >0. Hence proﬁts
are maximised by choosing Λ = X0+X1
N +X2+X3+C, retaining all N customers
and obtaining proﬁts from securities transaction services of
Π = N × C + X1
Proﬁts thus equal the number of customers times the switching cost N × C
plus the incumbent’s ﬁxed cost advantage X1.
4.1.2 The impact of simpliﬁed standards
Consider now an agreement across the industry, introducing simpliﬁed
communication standards. Suppose this has the following impacts on costs:
• It reduces the ﬁxed cost C of switching to an alternative supplier of
transactions management services, from the CSD to the custodian bank,
ie it alters C by ∆C<0
• It lowers the per account costs of providing securities transaction services,
so X2 alters by by ∆X2 < 0 and X3 by ∆X3 < 0 .
• It lowers the ﬁxed costs of providing securities transaction services, to
incumbent and to the competitors, so X0 alters by ∆X0 < 0 and X1 by
∆X1 < 0.
• The change in standards involves a ﬁxed investment cost of K for each
CSD and custodian.
18Under the assumptions of this model, the introduction of the new standards
will then result in a change of proﬁts for the CSD of:
∆Π = ∆X1 + N × ∆C + K<0
Because competitors have access to the same technology, the reductions in the
per account costs X2 and X3 and ﬁxed costs X0 have no impact on proﬁts.
Thus even if processing costs are substantially reduced by the introduction of
new standards, incumbent revenues decline by more than costs and proﬁts fall.
Even in this case where switching costs and linkage costs remain unchanged,
CSD proﬁts are still reduced by the cost of implementing the standard K.
The introduction of new standards could only raise incumbent proﬁts if
it had a diﬀerential impact on costs, lowering the processing costs of the
incumbent by more than the processing costs of the potential competitor.
While this is not impossible the impact would have to be large enough to more
than oﬀset the increase in competition arising from lower switching and linkage
costs and the ﬁxed costs of implementing the standard.
4.2 Model 2: the case of domestic and foreign customers
This subsection extends the simple model of the previous sub-section to a
situation where there are two securities, for which transaction accounts are
each provided by a diﬀerent CSD. These two securities can be interpreted as
domestic securities located in diﬀerent countries a and b, although they could
as well be a domestic and an international security. Assume that there are N
customers in country a (domestic customers) seeking to settle 1 transaction
per period of securities located in a.T h e r ea r ea l s on customers from country b
(foreign customers) seeking to settle θ ≤ 1 transactions per period of securities
l o c a t e di nc o u n t r ya. Discriminatory charging (diﬀerent prices for domestic
and foreign customers) is prohibited.
4.2.1 Domestic competition for foreign and domestic investors
The Appendix derives the equilibrium average pricing and proﬁts in this
extended model. Consider ﬁrst the situation where (for legal or other
reasons, including diﬀering national standards) only domestic ﬁrms are able
to compete in the market for transaction processing of securities traded and
issued in country a. Since foreign customers have diﬀerent transaction volumes
than domestic customers, it is now necessary to distinguish per-customer
membership charges (Λ) from per transaction charges (λ). Note that average
per-customer revenue will be a weighted average of Λ and λ, with the weights
depending upon both the numbers of domestic and foreign customers (N,n)
and the volume of transaction undertaken by each customer (1,θ). As shown
19in the appendix, the equilibrium average per customer revenue is then subject
to the constraint8








,θ < q < 1
and when this constraint binds, ie when charges are set so as to maximise
proﬁts, the domestic incumbent makes proﬁts of
π =( N + n)C + X1 (4.2)
ie the incumbent now makes proﬁts that capture the switching costs of both
domestic and foreign customers.
Note that foreign investor business is much more proﬁtable, on a per
transaction basis, than domestic investor business. This is because the rent per
customer C extracted from the switching cost is spread over a much smaller
number of transactions. The model thus also explains why ‘cross-border’
securities processing is relatively expensive, a consequence of the smaller
volume of transactions per customer.
4.2.2 International competition for foreign and domestic investors
As shown in the Appendix, in this model allowing foreign CSDs to enter
intensiﬁes competition in the market for transactions processing of domestic
securities. In this case the average per customer revenue constraint is
Λ + qλ ≤ C + X2 + qX3 +
X1
N + n
and when this constraint binds the domestic incumbent now makes proﬁts of
π =( N + n)C + X1 − X0 (4.3)
The reason for the lower level of proﬁts in (4.3) compared to (4.2)is that the
ﬁxed costs X0 of foreign CSDs are already covered by their own processing and
custodian business. Unlike domestic potential entrants they only have to cover
the additional linkage costs X1 in order to compete for domestic business. The
proﬁts of the domestic incumbent are reduced by X0.
The outcome is displayed geometrically in Figure 1. Here the horizontal
axis represents the per-transaction charge while the vertical represents the
charge per customer. The upper solid line is the constraint when there is only
domestic competition. The middle dashed line is the constraint when there
8There are additional constraints on pricing, stated in the appendix, avoiding the
possibility that either domestic or foreign customers are captured by the domestic
competitor. These constraints aﬀect the relative magnitude of Λ and λ but do not aﬀect
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Figure 1: Pricing constraints on incumbent
is foreign competition. The proﬁts of the incumbent are represented by the
distance between these lines and the zero-proﬁtc h a r g i n gl i n e( t h ed o t t e dl i n e ) .
The introduction of foreign competition moves the pricing constraint inward
and reduces proﬁts. Note that shifting the mix of charging — for example
reducing the per customer charge while increasing the per-transaction charge,
while keeping average per-customer charges constant — does not aﬀect proﬁts.
The mix of charges is undetermined in this model.
The principal additional insight oﬀered by this extended model with
international competition is that the introduction of European or global
standards, that allow cross border supply of securities transaction services,
will further increase competition and reduce the proﬁtability of incumbent
suppliers by more than a similar change to standards aﬀecting only domestic
suppliers. This is because these new foreign entrants do not need to cover
the ﬁxed cost X0 which domestic entrants must pay in order to compete for
customers transacting in domestic securities. Entry barriers are eﬀectively
reduced. Increased foreign competition provides a further reason why the
proﬁts incumbent service providers may fall following a change in processing
standards that facilitates cross-border settlement transactions.
215 Conclusion: governance and the promotion of
eﬃcient securities processing standards
This paper has reviewed standard setting in post-trade securities processing
and analysed how changes in these standards impact on the proﬁtability of
providing securities transaction services. The main point developed here,
supported by the models presented in Section 4, is that the introduction of
harmonised simple standards for messaging and other aspects of securities
processing is likely to lower the proﬁtability of the providers of securities
transactions services, by reducing the costs of switching between suppliers and
the costs of market entry by overseas competitors. Consumers of these services,
mostly broker-dealers and institutional investors, gain from harmonisation and
simpliﬁcation of processing standards, through lowered transaction costs and
more reliable and faster automated processing. But ﬁrms supplying transaction
services may be reluctant to implement these changes.
This is not the situation in all industries. As discussed in section 3
it is possible for standardisation to have the opposite impact, reducing
competition and increasing proﬁtability. For example where customer demand
depends on market share (eg where there is an ‘adoption’ externality for
compatible products) then standardisation, widening these externalities to
cover all products on the market, reduces incentives to compete for market
share and this in turn can lead to higher prices and increased proﬁtability.
Standardisation may also promote growth in demand. In communication
industries such as telecoms, there are strong business incentives to create
common standards, eg for international traﬃc, to support market growth.
These mechanisms do not appear to be anything like so strong in the case
of securities processing where ‘adoption externalities’ are not so obviously
important and where the volume of transactions is not greatly dependent on
standards.
While outside the formal modelling presented in this paper, other
factors also inhibit the introduction of new simpliﬁed standards in securities
processing. Adoption of standards in ﬁnancial markets is, generally, voluntary.
Individual institutions may be reluctant to replace legacy processing systems.
They may agree to minor changes in standards that can be adopted through
adjustments to existing procedures; but be reluctant to agree to radical change
such as the introduction of entirely new XML formatting. The new formats
may struggle to acquire critical mass.
This implies that the ownership, objectives, and governance of post-trade
institutions; and of industry standard-setting bodies are critical to the
successful introduction of new standards and the promotion of fully automated
straight through processing. Both broker dealers and ﬁnal customers,
particularly institutional investors and trading institutions such as hedge
funds, need to be represented in the process of standard setting for the
securities processing industry and would be well advised to pay careful
attention to the setting of standards.
This also draws attention to questions of ownership structure and
governance. Some providers are customer owned and sometimes also not-for
22proﬁt (eg DTCC in the US, Euroclear in Europe). Others, notably
banks providing cross-border securities processing such as Citigroup and
BNP-Paribas, are for private public-equity ﬁrms. Finally there are some
subsidiaries of for-proﬁt securities exchanges (including the Deutsche Borse
subsidiary Clearstream). There is no obvious solution to the challenge of
persuading a such wide group of suppliers, each with their own business
interests, to accept simpliﬁed, and harmonised processing standards. It is
not even clear which form of ownership creates the strongest incentives to
adopt new standards. Customer-owned suppliers may have relatively weak
incentives introduce new processing standards, since they are in large part
owned by exchanges and broker-dealers who do not beneﬁt directly from lower
charges to ﬁnal investors. Final investors on the other hand, may be able to
inﬂuence for proﬁt companies to introduce new standards, because they are
the ultimate owners.
SWIFT plays a central role, because of its broad industry ownership and
the important function it already plays in establishing messaging formats. But
as noted above in Section 2, SWIFT cannot make ﬁrms adopt new standards,
these are ultimately individual business decisions. In the context of promoting
standardised common arrangements for securities processing across Europe,
public authorities will need to pay close attention to both the eﬀorts of SWIFT
and of the securities market practice group (SMPG) to develop and establish
common European securities processing standards; and to the adoption of these
standards across the industry. Little progress may be made without the threat
of regulatory intervention, for example to impose standards on the industry.
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25Appendix
Model solution
This appendix presents the solution of model 2 of Section 3. model 1 is a
special case of model 2 when n =0and there is only domestic competition
for securities processing business. A solution to the model is described by the
equilibrium pricing decisions of the incumbent CSD (membership fee Λ and
per transaction fee λ), as constrained by the pricing decision of the potential
competitors (the domestic competitor setting a membership fee Λ0 and per
transaction fee λ




Assuming it retains the business of both foreign and domestic customers, the
proﬁts of the incumbent can be written as
π = N (Λ + λ − X2 − X3)+n(Λ + θλ− X2 − θX3) − X0
If the domestic competitor attracts both domestic and foreign customers it
earns proﬁts of
π = N (Λ
0 + λ
0 − X2 − X3)+n(Λ
0 + θλ
0 − X2 − θX3) − X0 − X1
while if it attracts only domestic customers it earns proﬁts of
π = N (Λ
0 + λ
0 − X2 − X3) − X0 − X1
If the overseas competitor attracts both domestic and foreign customers it
earns proﬁts (from this additional business) of
π = N (Λ
00 + λ
00 − X2 − X3)+n(θλ
00 − X2 − θX3) − X1
while if it attracts only the foreign customers it earns proﬁts of
π = n(θλ
0 − X2 − θX3) − X1
Incentives to switch
The domestic customers will switch to the domestic competitor if the reduction
in charging exceeds the switching cost
Λ − Λ








26while they will switch to the foreign competitor if
Λ − Λ








The foreign customers will switch to the domestic competitor if the reduction
in charging exceeds the switching cost
Λ − Λ








while they will switch to the foreign competitor if
Λ − Λ








Determination of pricing: domestic competition only
Λ and λ are set at levels at which a zero proﬁt competitor(s) imposing prices of
Λ0 and λ
0 or Λ00 and θλ
00 c a nj u s tp e r s u a d eb o t hd o m e s t i ca n df o r e i g nc u s t o m e r s
to switch.Consider ﬁrst the domestic competitor competing for all customers.
Λ and λ must satisfy
π
0 = N (Λ
0 + λ
0 − X2 − X3)+n(Λ
0 + θλ












which yields the following constraint on average revenue per customer (which
is also a constraint on total revenue since when this constrain applies the
incumbent retains all the customers):








27( n o t et h a ts i n c eθ<1 and n<Nq s a t i s fi e sθ<q<1.) When this constraint
binds the domestic incumbent makes proﬁts given by (4.2)
Determination of pricing: foreign competition
Consider next the introduction of the foreign competitor. Λ and λ must satisfy
π
00 = N (Λ
00 + λ
00 − X2 − X3)+n(θλ











which yields the total revenue constraint




and when this constraint binds the domestic incumbent makes the lower level
of proﬁts given by (4.3).
Additional pricing constraints
Finally there is the possibility of losing only a subset of customers, either
the domestic customers alone, or the foreign customers alone. This imposes
additional constraints on the relative values of Λ and λ (the balance between
per transaction and per member charges). There are two such constraints
when there is no foreign competition and two more constraints when there is
foreign competition.
When there is competition from only a domestic potential entrant then the
incumbents prices must be such that
π
0 = N (Λ
0 + λ
0 − X2 − X3) − X0 − X1 ≤ 0
when
Λ − Λ
0 + λ − λ
0 = C
yielding







0 − X2 − X3) − X0 − X1 ≤ 0
when
Λ − Λ
0 + θ(λ − λ
0)=C
28yielding
Λ + θλ ≤ C + X2 + θX3 +
X0 + X1
n
Computing the price levels at which these constraints bind, together with the
aggregate per customer revenue constraint (5.1) yields upper and lower bounds




≤ λ ≤ X3 +
X0 + X1
N (1 − θ)
When there is competition from a foreign competitor then the incumbents
prices must be such that
π
00 = N (Λ
00 + λ
00 − X2 − X3) − X1 ≤ 0
when
Λ − Λ
00 + λ − λ
00 = C
yielding






00 − X2 − X3) − X1 ≤ 0
when
Λ + θ(λ − λ
0)=C
yielding
Λ + θλ ≤ C + X2 + θX3 +
X1
n





≤ λ ≤ X3 +
X1
N (1 − θ)
In practice these additional constraints (computed using reasonable parameter
values such as those adopted for Figure 1) are rather wide, allowing for the
possibility even of negative values for either Λ or λ.
29 
BANK OF FINLAND RESEARCH 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online 
 
1/2005  Patrick M. Crowley  An intuitive guide to wavelets for economists. 2005.  
68 p. ISBN 952-462-188-6, print; ISBN 952-462-189-4, online. 
 
2/2005  Tuomas Saarenheimo  Ageing, interest rates, and financial flows. 2005. 
30 p. ISBN 952-462-190-8, print; ISBN 952-462-191-6, online. 
 
3/2005 Timo  Vesala    Relationship lending and competition: Higher switching 
cost does not necessarily imply greater relationship benefits. 2005. 
27 p. ISBN 952-462-192-4, print; ISBN 952-462-193-2, online. 
 
4/2005  Johanna Sinkkonen  Labour productivity growth and industry structure. 
The impact of industry structure on productivity growth, export prices and 
labour compensation. 2005. 88 p. ISBN 952-462-196-7, print; 
ISBN 952-462-197-5, online. 
 
5/2005  Matti Virén  Why do capital intensive companies pay higher wages? 
2005. 23 p. ISBN 952-462-198-3, print; ISBN 952-462-199-1, online. 
 
6/2005  Maritta Paloviita – Matti Virén The role of expectations in the inflation 
process in the euro area. 2005. 33 p. ISBN 952-462-200-9, print; 
ISBN 952-462-201-7, online. 
 
7/2005  Marketta Henriksson  Productivity differentials and external balance in 
ERM II. 2005. 32 p. ISBN 952-462-202-5, print; ISBN 952-462-203-3, online. 
 
8/2005  Matti Virén  Government size and output volatility: is there a relationship? 
2005. 24 p. ISBN 952-462-204-1, print; ISBN 952-462-205-X, online. 
 
9/2005  Karlo Kauko  Bank interest rates in a small European economy: Some 
exploratory macro level analyses using Finnish data. 2005. 44 p. 
ISBN 952-462-206-8, print; ISBN 952-462-207-6, online. 
 
10/2005  Essi Eerola – Niku Määttänen  The optimal tax treatment of housing capital 
in the neoclassical growth model. 2005. 30 p. ISBN 952-462-210-6, print; 
ISBN 952-462-211-4, online. 
 
11/2005  Karlo Kauko  The mixed oligopoly of cross-border payment systems. 2005. 
31 p. ISBN 952-462-212-2, print; ISBN 952-462-213-0, online. 
  
 
12/2005  Patrick M. Crowley – Jim Lee  Decomposing the co-movement of the 
business cycle: a time-frequency analysis of growth cycles in the euro area. 
2005. 67 p. ISBN 952-462-214-9, print; ISBN 952-462-215-7, online. 
 
13/2005  Jarmo Pesola  Banking fragility and distress: An econometric study of 
macroeconomic determinants. 2005. 95 p. ISBN 952-462-216-5, print; 
ISBN 952-462-217-3, online. 
 
14/2005 Karlo Kauko  The demand for money market mutual funds. 2005. 29 s. 
ISBN 952-462-218-1, print; ISBN 952-462-219-X, online. 
 
15/2005  Matti Virén  Fiscal policy in the 1920s and 1930s. How much different it is 
from the post war period’s policies? 2005. 27 p. ISBN 952-462-220-3, print; 
ISBN 952-462-221-1, online. 
 
16/2005  Alistair Milne  What’s in it for us? Network effects and bank payment 
innovation. 2005. 27 p. ISBN 952-462-223-8, print; ISBN 952-462-224-6, 
online. 
 
17/2005  Hilde C Bjørnland – Kai Leitemo  Identifying the interdependence between 
US monetary policy and the stock market. 2005. 43 p. ISBN 952-462-225-4, 
print; ISBN 952-462-226-2, online. 
 
18/2005  Juha Tarkka – Mika Kortelainen  International economic spillovers and the 
liquidity trap. 2005. 86 p. ISBN 952-462-227-0, print; ISBN 952-462-228-9, 
online. 
 
19/2005  Kari Kemppainen  Assessing effects of price regulation in retail payment 
systems. 2005. 32 p. ISBN 952-462-231-9, print; ISBN 952-462-232-7, online. 
 
20/2005  Kai Leitemo – Ulf Söderström  Robust monetary policy in a small open 
economy. 2005. 53 p. ISBN 952-462-233-5, print; ISBN 952-462-234-3, 
online. 
 
21/2005  Hanna-Leena Männistö  Forecasting with a forward-looking DGE model – 
combining long-run views of financial markets with macro forecasting. 
2005. 52 p. ISBN 952-462-235-1, print; ISBN 952-462-236-X, online. 
 
22/2005  Maritta Paloviita  Comparing alternative Phillips curve specifications: 
European results with survey-based expectations. 2005. 26 p.  
ISBN 952-462-237-8, print; ISBN 952-462-238-6, online. 
 
23/2005  Alistair Milne  Standard setting and competition in securities settlement. 
2005. 29 p. ISBN 952-462-239-4, print; ISBN 952-462-240-8, online. 
 Suomen Pankki
Bank of Finland
P.O.Box 160
FI-00101 HELSINKI
Finland